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l. Introduction 
As sociologists from Simmel to Luhmann have argued, trust is a basic social 
mechanism for coping with system complexity. It facilitates cooperation, 
simplifies transactions and makes available the knowledge and experience of 
others. Also recent research in game theory and in industrial economics 
emphasizes the importance of trust, and of the reputation system on which 
trust is based, for sustaining cooperation in a world of self-interested 
individuals, and for governing contractual relations more complex than simple 
spot-market transactions. 
The significance of mutual trust for a system as complex as the single 
European market could not have escaped the attention of the drafters of the 
founding treaties. Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome expresses the requirement 
of Community loyalty in the following terms: 
Member States shall take all appropriate measures. 
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment 
of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the 
Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of 
the Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardize the attairunent of the objectives of this 
Treaty. 
Analogous prescriptions are contained in article 86 of the treaty establishing 
the European Coal and Steel Community, and in article 192 of the Euratom 
treaty. 
Mutual trust is clearly crucial for a system which depends on the loyal 
cooperation of the member states, and of their administrations, for the 
formulation and implementation of common rules. In fact, the European 
Court of Justice has interpreted article 5 in a way that. going well beyond the 
principle of international law that pacta sunt servanda, approaches the 
principle of Bundestreue or "federal comity" of German constitutional law 
(Due, 1992; Scharpf, 1994). 
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In the interpretation of the Court, article 5 gives expression to a general 
principle of mutual trust and cooperation not only between member states and 
Community institutions, but also among national governments. In the same 
spirit, the Commission's White Paper on the Completion of the Internal 
Market (Commission of the European Communities, 1985) lists mutual trust 
as the first element of the new approach for the mutual recognition of 
diplomas. 
Thus, the starting point of this paper -- the strategic significance of 
trust in a system as open-ended and interdependent as the Community -- is 
hardly new. Unfortunately, the current debate on this issue tends to be 
legalistic, and seems to assume that trust can be elicited by preaching or 
imposed by judicial fiat. Still lacking are systematic analyses of the cascading 
effect of distrust on many problematic aspects of the integration process --
from excessive centralization and unnecessary uniformity to the paradox of 
over-regulation and under-implementation -- as well as concrete proposals for 
improving an increasingly unsatisfactory state of affairs. This paper is a first 
attempt to make some progress in both directions. Much more work remains 
to be done in preparation of the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference 
on institutional reform. 
2. Distrust and the paradox of centralization 
If trust is so important in reducing social complexity and sustaining 
cooperation then its lack must have serious consequences for the evolution of 
a system like the European Union. In this and the two following sections I 
examine the implications of distrust through the prism of several issues which 
figure prominently in the current debate on institutional reform: 
centralization, over-regulation, non-compliance, subsidiarity and mutual 
recognition. The general argument is that in all these cases, distrust --
toward the European institutions and among the member states themselves --
has impeded the development and/or the implementation of efficient 
solutions. 
Let us begin with what may be called the paradox of centralization. 
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Member states strive to preserve the greatest possible degree of sovereignty 
and policy discretion. This is shown, for example, by their stubborn 
resistance to the extension of supranational competences in the areas of 
foreign and security policy, taxation, and macroeconomic management, and 
by their refusal to give the European Commission a direct role in 
implementing EC policies. At the same time, however, these states have been 
willing to delegate important regulatory powers even in areas not mentioned 
by the founding treaties and for purposes not essential to the smooth 
functioning of the internal market. 
Thus, of seven areas of significant policy development at present --
regional policy, research and technological development, consumer protection, 
education, culture, environment and health and safery at work -- only the 
latter is explicitly mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, and then only as a field 
where the Commission should promote close cooperation among the member 
states (Article 118, EEC). 
Environmental policy is a striking illustration of the paradox of 
centralization. In the two decades from 1967 to 1987, when the Single 
European Act (SEA) finally recognized the competence of the Community to 
legislate in this area, well over 100 directives, regulations and decisions were 
introduced by the Commission and approved by the Council. Budgetary 
crises, intergovernmental dissensions, and the Europessimisrn of the 1970s 
and early 1980s hardly affected the rate of growth of Community 
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environmental regulation. From the single directive on "the approximation of 
laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to the classification, 
packaging and labelling of dangerous substances" of 1967 (Directive 
67/548/EEC) we pass to lO directives/decisions in 1975, 13 in 1980, 20 in 
1982, 23 in 1984, 24 in 1985, and 17 just in the six months preceding the 
passage of the SEA (Johnson and Corcelle, 1987). Today European 
environmental regulation includes more than 200 pieces of legislation. In 
many member states the corpus of environmental law of Community origin 
outweighs that of purely domestic origin (House of Lords, 1992). 
Moreover, while the first directives were for the most part concerned 
with product regulation, and hence could be justified by the need to prevent 
that national standards would create non-tariff barriers to the free movement 
of goods, later directives increasingly stressed process regulation (emission 
and ambient quality standards, regulation of waste disposal and of land use, 
protection of flora and fauna, environmental impact assessment), aiming at 
environmental rather than free-trade objectives. 
Why did the member states accept such a massive transfer of 
regulatory powers to the supranational level? After all, in the Community 
system the Council of Ministers, which represents the national interests, must 
approve all Commission proposals. In order to control transboundary 
pollution, countries have to cooperate, of course, but international cooperation 
can take many fonns. As Coase (1960) showed, problems caused by negative 
externalities could be solved efficiently through decentralized arrangements. 
If national regulators could credibly commit themselves to take into account 
the international repercussions of their decisions and to implement in good 
faith intergovernmental agreements, international market failures could be 
managed in a decentralized fashion, without delegating regulatory powers to a 
supranational authority. An international secretariat would suffice to facilitate 
the exchange of information and to reduce the costs of organizing 
cooperation. 
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The problem with international regulatory agreem.ents is that it is often 
difficult for the parties concerned to know whether or not an agreement is 
properly kept. The main reason for this is that economic and social regulation 
is unavoidably discretionary. Because regulators lack information that only 
regulated firms have and because governments are reluctant, for political 
reasons, to impose excessive costs on industry, bargaining is an essential 
feature of regulatory enforcement. Regardless of what the law says, the 
process of regulation is not simply one where the regulators command and 
the regulated obey. A "market" is created in which bureaucrats and those 
subject to regulation bargain over the precise obligations of the latter 
(Peacock, 1984). Since bargaining is so pervasive, it is often difficult for an 
outside observer to detennine whether the spirit, or only the letter, of an 
international agreement has been violated. 
When it is difficult to observe whether the parties are making an 
honest effort to enforce a cooperative agreement. the agreement is not 
credible. Hence, many international market failures carmot, in practice, be 
corrected in a decentralized fashion because of problems of trust and 
credibility. Notice, too, that international regulatory failures may occur even 
in the case of purely local market failures. For example, problems of safety 
regulation for construction of local buildings create no transboundary 
externalities and thus, according to the subsidiarity principle, should be left to 
the local authorities. However, if safety regulations specify a particular 
material produced only in that locality, they may amount to a trade barrier 
and thus have negative external effects. In such a case, local regulation of a 
local market failure creates an international regulatory failure. 
Similarly, local authorities have sometimes controlled air pollution by 
requiring extremely tall smokestacks on industrial facilities. With tall stacks, 
by the time the emissions descend to ground level they are usually in the 
next city, region or state, and so of no concern to the jurisdiction where they 
were produced. 
6 
These examples illustrate a dilemma of regulatory federalism which the 
principle of subsidiarity cannot resolve in the absence of mutual trust and a 
sense of comity. Local or national govenunents may be more attuned to 
individual preferences, but they are unlikely to make a clear separation 
between providing public goods for their citizens and engaging in policies 
designed to advantage the locality or the country at the expense of its 
neighbours. Centralization of regulatory authority at a higher level of 
government can correct such externalities, and possibly capture economies of 
scale in policy making. But its cost is the ho~nogenization of regulation 
across jurisdictions that may be dissimilar with respect to underlying 
preferences or needs (Noli, 1990). 
In sum, the paradox of centralization can be explained, in part, by the 
fear that national govermnents may use regulation to promote their own 
interests ruther than common regulatory objectives (for a more complete 
analysis of the paradox see Majone, 1992). On the other hand, it should be 
noticed that the optimal assignment of regulatory responsibilities among 
different levels of governments need not coincide with existing jurisdictional 
boundaries. There may be significant externalities and a need for joint action 
between some, but not all, regions within a country or group of countries. 
Hence the optimal solution may be found neither at the European nor 
at the national level, but at some intermediate level comprising a group of 
states (or regions within different states) facing the same problem. The scope 
of the externality would determine the membership of the group. Self-
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regulating organizations encompassing several states ("regional compacts", 
such as the Delaware River Basin Commission) have been used in the United 
States since the 1960s and in some cases even earlier (Derthick, 1974). More 
recently, institutional arrangements encompassing American states and 
Canadian provinces have been created in order to control pollution in the 
Great Lakes region. 
By pooling their financiaL teclmical and administrative resources these 
consortia of states or regions are in a better position to deal satisfactorily 
with their regulatory problems than either by acting alone or by relying 
exclusively on centralized regulation which cannot be closely tailored to their 
specific needs. The "regional compact" model combines flexibility with 
economies of scale in policy formation and implementation. Its adoption on 
this side of the Atlantic would have far-reaching consequences for the future 
of European regulation. Instead of the traditional dichotomy of centralized or 
national regulation, with its artificial separation of rule making from 
enforcement, we would have a system of different, but compatible, regulat01y 
regimes coordinated and monitored by a small regulatory body at the 
European level. Among the tasks of this body would be providing technical 
and administrative assistance, facilitating the diffusion of ideas and policy 
innovations, and acting as "regulator of last resort" where regional regulators 
failed to achieve their objectives. 
Ten years ago, a major study of European environmental law and 
policy noted that "[i]t is striking that the Community has not yet used the 
concept of regionally differentiated standards as a distinct harmonization 
strategy" (Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985, p.221). This is still true today, even 
if a few environmental directives allow member states to set regionally 
differentiated standards in zone designated by them in accordance with 
Community guidelines. The model suggested here goes much beyond these 
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timid attempts to tailor regulation to the specific needs of different regions of 
Europe. However, it assumes that member states are prepared to grant their 
own regions the freedom to deal directly with other regions and with the 
European institutions. Once more we run into the problem of trust. 
3. Distrust and the paradox of over-regulation and under-implementation 
The Brussels authorities are accused not only of centralizing tendencies but 
also of producing too many, and too complicated. rules. A recent report of 
the French Conseil d'Etat uses expressions like "normative drift", "luxuriating 
legislation" and "regulatory fury". It notes that by now the Community 
introduces into the corpus of French law (and presumably of other national 
laws as well) more rules than the national authorities (Conseil d'Etat, 1992). 
At the same time, it is common knowledge that many European rules 
are not faithfully implemented, or not implemented at all. The 
implementation deficit has become so serious over the years that the member 
states now realize that non-compliance threatens the credibility of their 
collective decisions. The European Council meeting at Dublin in June 1990 
first gave the issue of non-compliance a high political profile in its final 
declaration. At the Maastricht summit, the heads of state and government 
stressed again the need for Community rules to be accurately transposed into 
national law and effectively implemented, while the Treaty on European 
Union contains new powers for the European Court of Justice to fine member 
states which fail to comply with judgements of the Court. 
Despite this new awareness of the seriousness of the problem, the 
question raised by Joseph Weiler some years ago is still pertinent: how can 
there be a compliance problem given the strict control by the member states 
of the legislative process? (Weiler, 1988). Even more puzzling are the 
complaints about over-regulation since the Council, not the Commission, is 
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the ultimate legislator. To be sure, many factors are involved both in over-
regulation (Majone, 1994) and in non-compliance (Krislov, Ehlermann and 
Weiler, 1986). A full analysis of these phenomena is beyond the scope of this 
paper; here I limit myself to arguing that distrust must be included among the 
explanatory variables. 
In order to understand non-compliance one must keep in mind not only 
that member states are not enthusiastic about strict surveillance of their own 
markets in the interest of Union objectives, but also that their determination 
to implement vigorously European rules is weakened by the suspicion that 
other national governments may not behave in the same correct way 
(Vervaele, 1992). Without concrete measures to increase the level of mutual 
trust, therefore, the obligation of Community loyalty contained in article 5 of 
the Rome Treaty remains dead letter and cannot serve as a basis for a system 
of effective enforcement. 
In the preceding section I argued that the mutual distrust of the 
member states is responsible, in part, for a higher level of centralization than 
is strictly necessary for the smooth functioning of the internal market. But 
member states also mistrust European institutions and this attitude has 
significant, if paradoxical, consequences both for the quantitative growth of 
Community rules and for the poor level of enforcement. The immediate 
consequence is that the Commission is kept on very tight rein: it is 
chronically understaffed; closely monitored through an intricate system of 
"regulatory" and "management" committees which can block its proposals 
and transmit the file to the Council, which can overrule the Commission: and 
obliged to rely almost exclusively on the national bureaucracies for the 
implementation of the measures it elaborates. 
These drastic methods of control are only partially successful in 
limiting the regulatory discretion of the Commission (Majone, forthcoming) 
but produce several undesirable, and probably unanticipated, consequences. 
Consider first the budget constraint. 
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By national standards, the Community budget is quite small: less than 
1.3 per cent of the gross domestic product of the Union or about 4 per cent 
of the combined expenditures of the central governments of the member 
states. It is also very rigid, since compulsory expenditures represent almost 
70 per cent of the budget. These limited resources are insufficient to support 
large-scale initiatives in areas such as industrial policy, energy, transport or 
research and development, not to mention social policy or macroeconomic 
stabilization (Majone, 1993). However, the budget constraint has only a 
limited impact on regulatory activities. This is because the real costs of 
regulation are borne by the organizations and individuals who have to comply 
with it. Compared to these costs, the cost of producing the rules is negligible. 
The structural difference between regulatory policies and policies 
involving the direct expenditure of public funds is especially important for 
the analysis of EC policy making since not only the financial, but also the 
political and administrative costs of implementing European rules are borne 
by the national administrations rather than the Commission. Thus, the 
attempt to restrict the scope of supranational policies by imposing a tight 
budget constraint has unwittingly favoured the expansion of a mode of policy 
making that is largely immune to budgetary discipline. Given the constraint, 
regulation turned out to be the most effective way for the Commission to 
maximize its influence. 
Moreover, by denying the Commission any significant role in 
implementation the member states have encouraged a tendency to focus on 
the quantitative growth of European legislation (so that, for example, the 
number of directives approved by the Council is viewed as an important 
indicator of success) rather than on effective compliance and actual results. 
' 
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Over-regulation cannot be blamed only on the Commission, however. Many 
regulations and directives are introduced at the demand of individual member 
states, the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and a variety of private and public-interest groups, rather than by 
autonomous initiative of the Commission. While responsiveness to such 
demands may increase the legitimacy of the Commission, it also contributes 
to the apparently unstoppable growth of EC regulation. 
The consequences of uncontrolled and un-coordinated demands for EC 
legislation are aggravated by institutional factors. Because the Commission is 
a collegial body, central control over the regulatory activities of the different 
Directorates General (DGs) is weak. Lack of central coordination leads to 
serious inconsistencies across and within regulatory progranunes, absence of 
rational procedures for setting priorities, and insufficient attention to the cost-
effectiveness of individual rules. One method of limiting regulatory growth 
would be to set up an office with the power to oversee the entire regulatory 
process and to discipline the activities of the DGs by comparing the social 
benefits of proposed measures with the costs imposed on the European 
economy by the regulatory requirements. 
Such an office or "regulatory clearing house" (somewhat similar to the 
U .S. Office of Management and Budget) should be established at the highest 
level of the Commission. A centralized review process would help the 
Commission's president screen demands for EC regulations and shape a 
consistent set of measures to submit to the Council and to the European 
Parliament. 
Also the phenomenon of regulatory complexiry can be usefully 
analyzed from the perspective of this paper. Many students of EC policy 
making have pointed out that Community directives usually contain many 
more technical details than comparable national legislation. The explanation 
12 
that such regulatory complexity is due to the technical perfectionism of the 
Commission lacks plausibility: the Commission, as noted above, is 
chronically understaffed, has no in-house research capabilities, and is largely 
composed of generalists, not of technical experts. 
Rather, regulatory complexity is in part another manifestation of the 
cascading effect of mutual distrust. Doubting the commitment of other 
governments to seriously implement European rules, and being usually 
unfamiliar with different national styles of administration. national 
representatives often insist on spelling out mutual obligations in the greatest 
possible detail. On the other hand, a vague and open-ended directive not only 
gives a member state wide latitude for wrongful or self-interested application, 
but also prevents the possibility of invoking it by an individual before a 
national court (Weiler, 1988). Thus, regulatory complexity may also serve the 
objectives of the Commission by providing partial compensation for its 
exclusion from the implementation process. 
Also the labyrinthine system of committees of national experts, created 
to assist the Commission and at the same time to limit its discretion, favours 
regulatory complexity by introducing a strong technical bias into the 
Community regulatory process. In many cases. national experts have 
significantly increased the quality of Commission proposals (Weiler, 1988; 
Dehousse et al., 1992; Winter, 1993). In fact, what is known about the modus 
operandi of these committees suggests that debates there follow substantive 
rather than national lines. A good deal of copinage technocratigue develops 
between Commission officials and national experts interested in problem 
solving rather than in defending national positions (Eichener, 1992). By the 
time a Conunission proposal reaches the Council of Ministers all the 
technical details will have been worked out -- but little or no attention will 
have been paid to issues of cost-effectiveness or practical implementability. 
13 
This technical bias, combined with the reluctance of the Council to engage in 
difficult and time-consuming policy control, and with the lack of central 
oversight at the Commission level, may be another factor contributing to 
regulatory complexity. 
Empirical evidence on this point is scanty at best, but the hypothesis 
has also theoretical support. Some economists have argued that an 
explanation of regulatory complexity does not need to rest on the peculiar 
interests of the regulators but on the economic interests of third parties, 
namely, specialists in various aspects of regulation such as lawyers, 
accountants, engineers or safety experts. Unlike other interest groups, these 
experts care more about the process than the outcome of regulation. They 
have an interest in regulatory complexity because complexity increases the 
value of their expertise. Thus "red tape" may not be simply evidence of 
bureaucratic inefficiency or ineptness. Rather, in part, rule complexity is a 
private interest that arises because a complex regulatory environment allows 
for specialization in various stages of rule making, as well as in "rule 
intermediation" (Kearl, 1983; Quandt, 1983). 
4. Mutual trust and mutual recognition 
The new approach to harmonization and technical regulation outlined in the 
Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal Market (COM (85) 310 
final) represents the most important attempt so far to reduce both over-
regulation and regulatory complexity at the European level. As is known, the 
main elements of the new approach are the mutual recognition of national 
regulations and standards, and the delegation of quasi-legislative powers to 
European standardization bodies. Here I focus on the first element, and more 
specifically on the crucial importance of mutual trust for the success of the 
strategy of mutual recognition. 
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Since the free movement of workers is an essential condition for a 
common market, the idea of the mutual recognition of "diplomas, certificates 
and other evidence of formal qualifications" can be found already in article 
57 of the Treaty of Rome. The idea was in fact implemented fairly early in 
certain fields where national legislations were already similar, so that no 
complex harmonization was needed: in 1976 for medical doctors, in 1977 for 
nurses, in 1978 for dentists and veterinary surgeons, in 1983 for midwives 
and in 1985 for pharmacists. Little progress, however, could be made in other 
fields, notably law, architecture, engineering and the pharmaceutical 
profession, where national practices differed widely. Also, experience showed 
that the large measure of discretion retained by the member states often 
impeded the harmonization process. The national governments only 
implemented the minimum requirements of the directives, retaining the power 
to decide which diplomas of other member states complied with the relevant 
Community directive (Zilioli, 1989). 
In the 1985 White Paper, the Commission announced its intention of 
applying the Cassis de Dijon philosophy also to professional mobility. The 
new strategy aimed at a general (rather than sectoral) system of recognition 
based on the following elements: mutual trust between the member states: 
comparability of university studies across the member states; mutual 
recognition of degrees and diplomas without prior harmonization of the 
conditions for access to, and the exercise of, professions; and the extension of 
the general system to salary earners. 
These principles find concrete application in Directive 89/48 on "a 
general system for the recognition of higher education diplomas awarded on 
completion of vocational courses of at least three years' duration". Unlike the 
older sectoral directives, the new directive does not attempt to harmonize the 
length and curricula of professional education, or even the range of activities 
• 
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in which professionals can engage. Instead, the directive introduces a system 
by which the states can compensate for such differences, without restricting 
the freedom of movement. Mutual trust and loyal cooperation among the 
member states are supposed to replace the impossible task of harmonizing 
vastly different national systems of professional education and licensing. Each 
state is supposed to trust other states' courses of study as being generally 
equivalent to its own, and a competent national authority must accept the 
evidence provided by another member state. 
Mutual trust as a substitute for legally binding harmonization is an 
admirable principle, but it remains to be seen whether the appeal to a 
common cultural heritage shared by the different national systems of 
education is sufficient to limit the traditional right of the states to control the 
education of citizens and residents and to regulate the professions. The 
scattered empirical evidence so far available is not very encouraging. 
The problem is that instead of proposing concrete measures to increase 
mutual trust, the Commission tends to invoke general principles such as the 
conunon cultural heritage of European universities. In the 1985 White Paper 
it argued that "the objectives of national legislation, such as the protection of 
human health and life and of the environment, are more often than not 
identical", so that "the rules and control to achieve those objectives, although 
they may take different forms, essentially come down to the same thing, and 
so should normally be accorded recognition in all Member States 
(Conunission of the European Communities, 1985, p.l7). 
The limits of such a priori reasoning are shown, for example, by the 
judgement of the Court of Justice in the "wood-working machines" case 
(Case N'l88/84 ECR, 1986, p.419). In this case the court was confronted 
with two different national approaches to safety: German regulation was less 
strict and relied more on an adequate training of the users of this type of 
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machinery, while French regulation required additional protective devices on 
the machines. The Court ruled against the Commission which had argued that 
both regulations were essentially equivalent, and found that in the absence of 
harmonization at Community level, a member state could insist on the full 
respect of its national safety rules, and thus restrict the importation of certain 
goods. 
Advocates of mutual recognition often do not seem to realize how 
demanding the principle is. An American scholar haS noted that the mutual 
recognition approach may require a higher degree of comity among member 
states than the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution requires among 
individual states. The commerce clause has been interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court to allow each state to insist on its own product quality 
standards -- unless the subject matter has been preempted by federal 
legislation, or unless the state standards would unduly burden interstate 
commerce (Hufbauer, 1990, p.ll ). 
The crucial importance of trust between national administrations is 
demonstrated by the failure of early attempts to harmonize national 
regulations for the approval of new medical drugs. The old EC procedure 
included a set of harmonized criteria for testing new products, and the mutual 
recognition of toxicological and clinical trials. provided they were conducted 
according to EC rules. In order to speed up the process of mutual 
recognition, a "multi-state drug application procedure" (MSAP) was 
introduced in 1975. Under the MSAP, a company that had received a 
marketing authorization from the regulatory agency of a Member State could 
ask for mutual recognition of that approval by at least five other countries. 
The agencies of the countries nominated by the company had to approve or 
raise objections within 120 days. In case of objections, the Committee for 
Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) -- a group which includes experts 
• 
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from Member States and Commission representatives -- had to be notified. 
The CPMP would express its opinion within 60 days, and could be overruled 
by the national agency that had raised objections. 
The procedure did not work well. Actual decision times were much 
longer than those prescribed by the 1975 Directive, and national regulators 
did not appear to be bound either by decisions of other regulatory bodies, or 
by the opinions of the CPMP. Because of these disappointing results, the 
procedure was revised in 1983. Now only two countries had to be nominated 
in order to be able to apply for a multi-state approval. But even the new 
procedure did not succeed in streamlining the approval process since national 
regulators continued to raise objections against each other almost routinely 
(Kaufer, 1990). These difficulties finally induced the Commission to propose 
the establishment of a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal 
Products and the creation of a new centralized Community procedure, 
compulsory for biotechnology products and certain types of veterinary 
medicines, and available on an optional basis for other products, leading to a 
Community authorization. Both the agency and the centralized procedure 
have been established by Council Regulation No 2309/93 of 22 July 1993. 
The Regulation justifies the creation of the new agency and the 
centralized procedure by the need "to provide the Community with the means 
of resolving disagreements between Member States about the quality, safety 
and efficacy of medicinal products". The problem with the old decentralized 
procedure was that differences among national schools of medicines and 
differently perceived needs for new drugs led to divergent interpretations of 
drug approvals despite the fact that they had been prepared according to a 
standardized European format (Kaufer, 1990). Thus, mistrust may reflect 
insufficient understanding of different regulatory philosophies and of national 
styles of policy making. 
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However, it is likely that the decentralized procedure did not work also 
because some national regulators lacked, or were thought to lack, the 
scientific and technical expertise, financial resources, and policy infrastructure 
needed to deal effectively with complex regulatory issues. Community 
assistance may be needed in order to help all members achieve a level of 
competence sufficient to support mutual trust and effective cooperation. As a 
recent study of new regulatory strategies in the EC argues, "the 
'Europeanization' of expertise upon which a mutual recognition of risk 
assessment and consensus building may be built. presupposes the setting up 
of an infrastructure which not only ensures continuous cooperation between 
the Community and national administrations. but also an ongoing 
involvement of those communities of experts on which national 
administrative authorities rely" (Dehousse et al.. 1992. pp.l5-16). 
5. The fourfold path to trust and credibility 
The analysis developed in the preceding pages suggests several reforms --
some quite radical, others more incremental and in part already implemented 
on an ad hoc basis -- to improve cooperation among national and 
supranational institutions. The protracted and acrimonious debates which have 
accompanied the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty have at least made clear 
that the future of the Union lies not in further centralization but in an ever 
closer cooperation among the different levels and institutions of govemance. 
The reforms suggested here are inspired by the following principles. 
First, mutual trust and credible commitments cannot be achieved by 
contractual means or by other legal obligations, but only by changing the 
motivations of all the relevant actors. Second, a lasting reform of the present 
system cannot be limited to the European institutions. as much of the current 
debate seems to assume. but must also embrace national and sub-national 
i 
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governments, as well as non-governmental actors. Third. ih a J?hase of 
transition like the present one, clarity about objectives and about the best 
strategies for achieving them is more important than attention to what is 
politically or legally possible today: to reform is precisely to remove fhe 
constraints of the past. Finally, it should be noted that although the proposals 
made here address only some of the issues currently being debated, they form 
a reasonably coherent and self-contained subset. Moreover, they could be 
easily expanded to cover other issues such as the democratic deficit of 
European institutions and how to achieve transparency and political 
accountability without compromising the efficiency objectives of the internal 
market programme (Majone, forthcoming). 
After these preliminary remarks, we are ready to consider separately 
the four ways to increase trust and credibility. 
Greater political independence 
The fear that governments may use regulation strategically, to pursue short-
term political advantages rather than regulatory objectives, is arguably the 
main source of mutual distrust and lack of policy credibility. The 
consequences, as we saw, are more centralization and greater uniformity of 
norms than is necessary for market integration. Under the present institutional 
arrangements, however, a plea for more decentralization and greater 
normative flexibility is easily seen as an open invitation to grant further 
discretionary powers to the member states thereby placing market integration 
in jeopardy. 
The way out of this dilemma is to grant more independence to national 
(and, as I argue below, supranational) regulators so that their commitment to 
a set of objectives decided at the European level is not compromised by 
domestic political considerations or by ministerial interference. Independence 
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changes the motivation of regulators whose reputation now depends more on 
their ability to achieve the objectives assigned to their agencies than on their 
political skills. With independence. a problem-solving style of policy making 
tends to replace the more traditional bargaining style. Also. it is not difficult 
to show that greater independence implies more, rather than less, public 
accountability (Majone. 1994b ). 
By now the independence of central banks enjoys widespread political 
support in most countries of Europe. Also the Treaty of Maastricht. although 
generally opposed to further delegation of policy making powers to the 
supranational level. assigns sweeping powers to the European Central Bank 
(ECB). The ECB can make regulations that are binding in their entirety 'md 
become European and member states· law, without the involvement of the 
Council or of national parliaments. The Bank has a single objective, 
monetary stability. and the freedom to pursue this objective in complete 
independence of the other European institutions and of the national 
governments. Moreover. since the governors of the central banks of the 
member states are members of the ECB Council. they too must be insulated 
from domestic political influences in the performance of their task; they can 
no longer be players in the old game of pumping up the economy just before 
an election (Nicoll. 1993). 
The recent rise of (more or less) independent regulatory agencies 
throughout Europe (Majone. 1994b) shows that the perceived advantages of 
independence are not confined to central banks. Among the justifications for 
such agencies are the need for expertise in highly complex matter, combined 
with rule making and adjudicative functions that are inappropriate for a 
government department; and the usefulness of the agency model whenever it 
is hoped to free public administration from partisan politics and party 
political influence. Agencies are also said to provide greater policy continuity 
and stability than cabinets because they are one step removed from election 
returns (Baldwin and McCrudden, 1987). 
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While these advantages of agency independence are acknowledged in 
theory, old habits of ministerial interference continue to persist in practice. 
Even in Britain, after more than a decade of privatizations and deregulation, 
government departments still preserve important regulatory powers so that the 
operations of agencies often are dependent on prior decisions of the minister 
laying down the principles to be applied. ln Fmnce the minister of the 
Economy maintains important powers to regulate economic competition 
despite the creation in 1986 of the supposedly independent Conseil de la 
Concurrence. The minister remains the final decision maker in matters 
relating to mergers and acquisitions, and the power of investigating anti-
competitive practices is still in the hands of the administration. 
Even the powerful Bundeskartellamt of Germany must occasionally 
yield to ministerial decisions. Thus, in 1989 the agency opposed the merger 
of Daimler Benz with the Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm Company. Despite 
the clear danger of a distortion of competition in several important markets, 
the Minister of the Economy overrode the Bundeskartellamt allowing the 
merger to take place, subject to some conditions, in the name of industrial 
policy. 
The relative ease with which agency autonomy can be disregarded in 
the name of political considerations extraneous to the logic that led to the 
creation of independent bodies in the first place, show how precarious the 
position of national regulators still is. Until the respect of agency 
independence becomes part of the different national political cultures, the 
national and international credibility of their regulatory policies will continue 
to remain open to doubt. 
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Networking 
Credibility can be developed through team work. Although people may be 
weak on their own, they can build resolve by forming a group (Dixit and 
Nalebuff, 1991 ). The same is true of organizations. A regulatory agency 
which sees itself as part of an international network of institutions pursuing 
similar· objectives and facing analogous problems, rather than as a new and 
often marginal addition to a huge national bureaucracy, is more motivated to 
resist political pressures. This is because the regulator has an incentive to 
maintain his or her reputation in the eyes of fellow regulators in other 
countries. A politically motivated decision would compromise his/her 
international credibility and make cooperation more difficult to achieve in the 
future. 
Professional associations of regulators working in the same policy area 
(antitrust, regulation of financial services, environmental protection, 
occupational health and safety, and so on) have been in existence for many 
decades in the United States and Canada. The experience of these countries 
shows that such regulatory networks serve a variety of useful functions, 
including the exchange of information and the comparative evaluation of new 
policy ideas and instruments. Professional associations of regulators are also 
beginning to develop at the international level -- for example, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, IOSCO. The need of 
close professional links is even more urgent in Europe than in North America 
since, as was seen in section 4, lack of familiarity with the regulatory 
philosophies and administrative practices of other countries breeds distrust 
and impedes the practical implementation of the principle of mutual 
recognition. 
The European Commission should obviously play a key role in 
facilitating and coordinating the work of EU regulatory networks, and in 
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ensuring that their activities are consistent with European objectives. The 
network model is perhaps easiest to visualize in the field of competition. An 
over-worked and under-staffed DGIV has already advocated a move toward a 
decentralized system of enforcement via proceedings before national courts. 
However, .it has been rightly pointed out that it would make more sense to 
transfer responsibility for enforcement to the national competition authorities 
than to national courts and private litigants. These authorities perform a role 
which is analogous to that of DGIV, and they possess the kind of experience 
and expertise which courts of ordinary jurisdiction often lack. Moreover, 
there already exist direct links between Commission inspectors and national 
competition authorities as regards any investigations carried out by the 
Commission. In fact, under Regulation 17, the relevant national competition 
authority must be associated with inquiries and investigations, and its officials 
must be present if a search of premises is carried out (Harding, 1994, pp. 7 -9). 
There is no reason why the network model could not be extended to 
other areas of economic and social regulation. In fact, at an informal meeting 
of the Council of Ministers in October 1991, it was agreed that member 
states should establish an informal network of national enforcement officers 
concerned with environmental law. The recent creation of a number of 
European agencies (see below) may be seen as a further move in this 
direction. However, the logic of the model suggests that not only national 
regulators but also their counterparts in the Commission should be 
independent. Although European commissioners are not supposed to pursue 
national interests, usually they are politicians who, after leaving Brussels, will 
continue their careers at home. This makes national pressures often difficult 
to resist. In a number of well-publicized" cases, such pressures have produced 
flawed or at least inconsistent decisions. Again, competition policy, including 
the control of mergers and of anti-competitive state aid, provides the clearest 
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examples. Several analysts have argued that Europe will never have a 
coherent competition policy without a cartel office independent both from the 
national governments and from the Commission. Conunissioners would still 
be able to reverse an independent agency's decisions, as the German 
government does in the case of some Bundeskartellamfs rulings. But the 
political costs of doing so would be high. and the interference plain for all to 
see. 
Less legislation. better implementation 
The paradox of over-regulation and under-implementation was discussed in 
section 3. There is was pointed out that at present the Commission is 
motivated to pay more attention to rule-making than to the effective 
enforcement of the rules it proposes. This is because. with a few exceptions 
like competition policy and fisheries. the Commission plays no direct role in 
implementation. Future reforms must correct this bias. Closer cooperation 
among independent national regulators or among groups of countries, or 
regions in different countries, would make more decentralized rule making 
possible; but it would also increase the need for greater powers of inspection 
of national or regional regulatory activities. 
Even in areas like competition policy and environmental protection 
where many rules will continue to be set at the European level, there is a 
strong case for some form of centralized oversight of the measures taken by 
the member states to monitor and enforce compliance. This is because, to 
repeat a point already made, EC regulations lose credibility if they are not 
consistently implemented throughout the Union. Consistent implementation 
would require the creation of European inspectorates, but the reluctance of 
member states' governments to accept such a concept is almost universal. 
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A second-best solution, the idea of an "audit" inspectorate to examine 
the policies and perfonnance of national regulatory authorities, rather than 
seek to supplant them. has received much favourable attention recently. The 
audit inspectorate would publicly report its findings to member states, the 
Commission and to the European Parliament. It would report not only on 
actual outcomes, but also on shortcomings in administrative arrangements. 
such as inadequacies of training or resourcing, leading to insufficient 
regulatory activities. 
The issue of independence arises also in this context. The 1992 Report 
of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities on 
Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Legislation (House of 
Lords. 1992) rightly points out that the functions and powers of a European 
inspectorate should be carefully distinguished from the Commission's own 
duty to enforce Community policies in the event of failure to do so by the 
member states. Thus, in the case of environmental policy, the inspectorate 
should not be part of DGXI. Rather. "the logical home for an envirorunental 
inspectorate on the lines indicated is the European Environmental Agency. 
with whose functions the inspectorate would neatly dovetail" (ib., p.41). 
Institutional separation from the Commission would enable the inspectorate to 
scrutinize the Commission's own role, notably in providing assistance to the 
member states through the Structural Funds or the Cohesion Funds. Indeed, 
the use of such funds in the countries of southern Europe has sometimes 
produced serious consequences for the environment. 
For analogous reasons, European inspectorates in such fields as the 
regulation of medical drugs. veterinary and plant control. and health and 
safety at work should be organized within the corresponding new European 
agencies (Office of Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection and Control, 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, Agency for 
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Health and Safety at Work) rather than as offices of the Commission. Also 
existing European inspectorates in the areas of competition, agriculture and 
fisheries --now housed in DGIV, DGVI and DGXIV, respectively-- should 
be insulated from the Commission, possibly in connection with the 
transformation of the corresponding DG into an independent agency, see 
above. 
Improving regulatory capacities 
As was shown in section 4, early attempts to introduce the mutual recognition 
of toxilogical and clinical trials for approval of new medical trusts failed 
because national regulators raised objections against each other almost 
routinely. We suggested that in this as in other cases, mutual distrust may 
also have been caused by the perception that some regulators lacked the 
resources and expertise needed to deal competently with complex regulatory 
issues. 
It is a fact that regulatory capacities vary a good deal across the 
European Union. For example, until the late 1980s several member states 
lacked independent competition authorities or legislation on mergers. Even 
today most countries do not have a fully-fledged environmental protection 
agency or a specialized environmental inspectorate. Decentralization, both of 
rule making and of enforcement, remains problematic as long as such 
differences in regulatory capacity persists. Here, then, is a potentially fruitful 
field of cooperation between Community institutions (in particular the new 
European agencies) and national administrators. 
The practice of regulatory federalism in America provides some useful 
suggestions in this direction. For example, when the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSH Act) was passed in 1970, few states had comprehensive 
laws dealing with safety and health at work and fewer still had adequate 
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programmes to enforce them. In spite of this, the OSH Act did not provide 
for the complete federalization of this area. The objective of assuring safe 
and healthy conditions at the workplace was to be reached, in part, by 
"encouraging the States to assume the fullest responsibility for the 
administration and enforcement of state occupational safety and health laws", 
by means of federal grants and approved state plans (OSH Act, Section 
2(b)(ll)). 
The Act incorporates special mechanisms for utilizing state resources. 
The most important of these are the provisions for "state plans" contained in 
Section 18(b) through (g). While the Act generally preempts state 
enforcement once the federal government regulates, Section 18(b) provides 
that states desiring to regain responsibility for the development and 
enforcement of safety and health standards under state law, may do so by 
submitting and obtaining federal approval of a state plan which meets the 
requirements set forth in section 18(c). Approval of a state plan by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) permits the state to re-enter 
the field of occupational health and safety regulation. 
The Secretary of Labor (in whose Department OSHA is located) is to 
approve a state plan only if it demonstrates the availability of adequate 
financial resources and the existence of a sufficient number of trained 
personnel. States are entitled to receive federal funding for developing the 
plan and implementing it after approval. For the first three years after initial 
approval, all state plans are considered "developmental". During this period, 
when federal and state governments have concurrent jurisdiction. the 
Secretary evaluates the state plan at least every six months. States must 
submit annual activity reports and inform the public of its right to file written 
complaints during this three-year period. This procedure known as CASP A 
(Complaints About State Plan Administration) provides information which 
I 
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OSHA uses to determine whether a developmental plan should be rejected or 
certified as operational. 
Thus, the American implementation plans have three attractive features: 
(a) states retain the possibility to act if they see fit; (b) in order for them to 
do so, they must meet precise standards; (c) such a flexible solution takes due 
account of the fact that not all states enjoy a similar regulatory capacity; 
some of them need federal assistance in order to meet national standards. 
Could such a model be transposed at the EC level? The setting is of course 
radically different here. Far from being the exception, decentmlized 
implementation tends to be the rule. Yet, to require member states to draw up 
an implementation plan and to set up the means that are necessary to make it 
operational would force them to address the implementation issue more 
systematically than is cunently the case. Resources fonn the structural funds 
could be used to assist those member states lacking sufficient resources to 
develop the plans and the requisite structures. 
It is clear, however, that such a system can work only if the 
Community is technically equipped to assess the adequacy of implementation 
plans, to monitor the activity of national regulators, to provide guidance -- all 
activities that, by its own admission, the Commission is currently not in a 
position to carry out satisfactorily, but which could be entrusted to the new 
European agencies. Despite the practical difficulties, the proposed scheme is 
quite in line with the subsidiarity principle: member states would retain their 
primary responsibility, while the Community's main task would be to assist 
and supplement their action (Dehousse et al., 1992. pp.63-65). 
6. Conclusion: refonn begins at home 
The Treaty on European Union contains two important political signals: first, 
the member states are not prepared to accept an unlimited expansion of 
Community competences and, second, the Commission has been weakened. 
The "three pillar" structure of the Union signifies a refusal to 
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"communitarize" foreign policy and inunigration matters. Even the new 
competences established by the treaty in fields such as education, culture, 
public health or consumer protection are replete with reservations: the 
Community can encourage cooperation among the member states, support and 
supplement their action, but harmonization of national laws is often excluded. 
As far as the Conunission is concerned, not only were most of its proposals 
postponed or rejected, but its institutional status was weakened. One 
cornerstone of its power, the right of initiative, has been watered down in 
monetary policy where it only enjoys the right to put forward 
recommendations. It is also bound to play a lesser role in the new eo-decision 
procedure. Furthermore, some declarations attached to the treaty (declarations 
on transparency and access to information, and on the cost-benefit evaluation 
of Commission proposals) suggest that its legitimacy has been questioned 
(Dehousse et al., pp.8-l 0). 
The Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform scheduled to 
begin in 1996 should draw all the conclusions that logically follow from 
these premises. If the future of the Union lies not in more centralization but 
in closer cooperation among the different levels and institutions of 
governance, then the member states must be prepared to take concrete 
measures to improve mutual trust and the credibility of their commitment to 
the common objectives. This will require, inter alia. greater determination to 
resist the pressures coming from domestic distributional coalitions. and the 
temptation to gain short-term political advantages at the expense of policy 
consistency. Given the nature of the democratic process, these conditions are 
best met by delegating regulatory powers to politically independent 
institutions. I have argued that such delegation would not only increase policy 
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credibility, but also greatly facilitate cooperation among national, subnational 
and European authorities. A similar institutional development at the EC level, 
resulting in a bigger role for the European agencies, would also make 
possible to undertake activities, such as monitoring and certain types of 
research, best done at that level, without increasing the size of the 
Commission. 
In the post-Maastricht era institutional reform must begin at home. 
Unless the national governments are willing to rethink their role in the 
economy and to show concretely their commitment to the common 
objectives, the only alternatives are more centralization or a progressive 
weakening of the economic and political foundations of the Union. 
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